Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1980

Frances E. Bernard v. John W. Attebury : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Wendell P. Ables; Attorney for Defendant and Appellant;
Ted Cannon; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Bernard v. Attebury, No. 16985 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2247

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FRANCES E.

)

BERl~ARD

Plaintiff and
Respondent
vs

)

)

Case No. 16985

)

JOHN W. ATTEBURY

)

Defendant and
Appellant

)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal from a Consolidated Order of the Third
District Court in and for Salt Lake Cotmty
Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge
TED CANNON
Salt Lake Cotmty Attorney
Sandra N. Peuler
Deputy County Attorney
243 East 4-th South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent
WENDELL P. ABLES
Suite 14, Intrade Building
1399 South Seventh East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Attorney for Defendant and
App~llant

SEP 19 1980
............ ------------·--.. -- ··-- --- __ . ,. ·----1 ·--

~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
i

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FRANCES E.

)

BERl~ARD

Plaintiff and
Respondent

)
)

vs

Case No. 16985

)

JOHN W. ATTEBURY

)

Defendant and
Appellant

)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal from a Consolidated Order of the Third
District Court in and for Salt Lake County
Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge
TED CANNON
Salt Lake County Attorney
Sandra N. Peuler
Deputy County Attorney
243 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent
WENDELL P. ABLES
Suite 14, Intrade Building
1399 South Seventh East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Attorney for Defendant and
Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

l

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

l

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

l

ARGUMENT

3

POINT I.

POINT II.

POINT III.

POINT IV.

POINT V.

CONCLUSION

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN ORDERING SUPPORT FOR JOHN DAVID ATTEBURY
UNDER THE UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT
OF SUPPORT ACT.

3

JOHN DAVID AND JOHN JOSEPH ARE ENTITLED
TO SUPPORT FROM THEIR FATHER, AND THEIR
MOTHER IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF
SUPPORT FROM THE CHILDREN'S FATHER.

6

THE APPELLANT IS NOT RELIEVED OF HIS OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT HIS SONS BECAUSE THEIR
STEPFATHER IS COUTRIBUTING TO THEIR SUPPORT.

8

JOHN DAVID WAS NOT EMANCIPATED UNTIL HE
REACHED THE AGE OF 18 &\ID WAS, THEREFORE,
ENTITLED TO SUPPORT UNTIL HIS 18TH BIRTHDAY.

10

THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT PRECLUDED BY RES
JUDICATA FROM CONSIDERING THE ISSUES OF
ONGOING SUPPORT AND ARREARAGES IN SUPPORT
AT SEPARATE TIMES.

16

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

- i

-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20

CASES CITED
Page
Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141(1974)

6, 7, 20

Bates v. Bates, 310 NYS 2d 26 (1970)
Cl~rk

12, 14

v. Dept. of Social Services, 554 P.2d 1320 (1976)

Commercial Security Bank v. Corporation Nine
600 P.2d lOOO (1979)

7
16, 17, 21

DeBry v. DeBry, 27 U.2d 237, 496 P.2d 92 (1972)

6

East Mill Creek Water Co. v. Salt Lake City

159 P.2d 863 (1945)

Fevig v. Fevig, 559 P.2d 841 (N.M.1977)

16
11, 12, 14, 15

French v. Johnson, 401 P.2d 315, 16 U.2d

360 (1965)

7, 20

Gulley v. Gulley, 570 P.2d 127 (1977 Utah)

6

Harmon v. Harmon, 491 P. 2d 231 (1971 Utah )

18

Holmes v. Raffo, 374 P.2d 536, 60 Wash 2d

421 (1962)

11, 15, 20

v. LeCheminant, 22 U.2d 334, 453
. 2d 140 (1969)

Kie~e

19, 20, 21

Larsen v. Larsen, 561 P.2d 1077 (1977 Utah)
Neisen v. Neisen, 15 7 N. W. 2d 660, 38 Wisc. 2d
599, 32 ALR 3d 1047 (1968)

8

11, 14
6

Price v. Price, 4 U.2d 153, 289 P.2d 1044 (1955)

17

Ray v. Consolidated Freightways, 289 P.2d 196 (1955)
Riding vs. Riding, 8 U.2d 136, 320 P.2d 878 (1958)

6' 10
12

Sanders v. Levine, 384 NYS 2d 636 (1976)
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 US7 (1975)

Tencza v. Aetna Casualt~ & Surety Co., 527 P.2d

97, 111 Ariz. 226 (1 74)

Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial, 27 P.2d 434, 83 Utah

166 (1930)

6' 20

11, 12' 15
6' 11

Wasescha
v. by Wasecha,
(Utah
19?5~
Sponsored
the S.J. Quinney Law548
Library.P.2d
Funding for895
digitization
provided by
the Institute~-of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ii·

STATUTES CITED
Page

Utah Code Annotated 78-45-4.l (1953 as amended 1979)

8, 9, 10

Utah Code Annotated 78-45-4.2 (1953 as amended 1979)

8, 9

Utah Code Annotated 78-45-7 (1953 as amended)

4, 5' 9

Utah Code Annotated 77-31-7 (1953 as amended 1980)

4, 9

Utah Code Annotated 77-31-24 (1953 as amended 1980)

4

Utah Code Annotated 77-45b-l. l (1953 as amended)

9

Utah Code Annotated 78-45-3 (1953 as amended)

8

Utah Code Annotated 78-45-4 (1953 as amended)

8

iii

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FRAL~CES

E. BERNARD

)

Plaintiff-Respondent

)

vs

Case No. 16895

)

JOHN W. ATTEBURY

)

Defendant-Appellant

)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondent concurs in appellant's statement of the
nature of the case.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Respondent concurs in appellant's statement of the
disposition of the case below.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent requests that the decision of the trial court
be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent and appellant were divorced on September 7,
1976, in the District Court for Sweetwater Cotmty, Wyoming.
Pursuant to the divorce decree respondent was awarded the custody
of the parties' two minor children.

Defendant agreed to pay

$500 per month, or $250 per child per month, as child support.
(T. 60 line 28-30).

This agreement was incorporated into the

- 1 -
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divorce decree.
The older son, John David dropped out of school in the
fall of 1976 when he was in the 9th grade. (T.94).

From that

time to the time of the August, 1979, hearing, he lived continuously with one of his parents, and held, intermittently,
several low paying short-term jobs.

Most of the time he was

living with his mother he was unemployed. (T.82 lines 20-30,
T. 83,84).

He was unable to secure steady employment because

he was still a minor. (T.94 lines 15-19, T.89 lines 23-27).
When he was employed he used the money as spending money
(T.91 lines 16-25) and contributed to household expenses only
sporadically (T. 92 lines 1-8).
At the time of the hearing John David was seventeen years
old

(T. 87 lines 10-11) and engaged to be married "when he

turned eighteen and could get a job." (T. 91 lines 2 7-30) .

He

was working on getting his high school diploma through the GED
Program. (T. 76 lines 25-29).
This action was connnenced on March 21, 1979, under the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act claiming support
from January, 1979, the date the boys went to live with their
mother in Wyoming.

On May 31, 1979, the Third District Court

entered an order temporarily reducing appellant's child support
obligation to $150 a month for the support of John Joseph, the
younger son, and reserving the issue of support for John David
- 2 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

until the Sweetwater County Attorney's Office investigated and
ascertained the whereabouts of John David.

After a hearing on

August 22, 1979, at which appellant-respondent and John David
testified and were cross-examined, the court ordered the appellant
to pay $150 per month for the support of John David during the
months of August, September, October, and November, 1979, at
which time he reached the age of majority, and $150 per month as
support for John Joseph.

The court also ordered the appellant

to pay to respondent $2000 in past due child support.

In cal-

culating these amounts, Judge Dee relieved appellant of his
obligation to support John David during two months in which the
minor was employed.

The order was signed August 31, 1979, and

entered on September 5, 1979.
On November 29, 1979, a new petition and order to show
cause was issued against appellant. (R 24). A hearing was held
on the question of whether the order of May 30, 1979, (R 11,12)
was res judicata on the issue of John David's right to support.
This hearing resulted in the consolidated order of January 16, 1980,
signed by Judge Uno (R 40,41).
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
ORDERING SUPPORT FOR JOHN DAVID ATTEBURY UNDER
THE UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT.

- 3 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act gives
the court of the responding state (in this case, Utah) some
discretion in determining whether the obligor owes a duty of support and the extent of such duty.

Two statutes bear this out.

Utah Code Annotated 77-31-24 (1953 as amended 1980) states that
"If the court of the responding state finds a duty of support,
it may order the respondent to furnish support or reimbursement
therefor and subject the property of the respondent to such order."
Utah Code Annotated 77-31-7 states:
Duties of support applicable under this act
are those imposed or imposeable under the
laws of any state where the obligor was
present during the period for which support
is sought. The obligor is presumed to have
been present in the responding state during
the period for which support is sought until
otherwise s]:lown.
The court has discretion and that discretion is circumscribed by

Utah law,as the defendant has, at all times relevant to this actioni
resided in Utah.
Utah law requires that the court in determining the
amount of the obligation to support take into account several
factors.

Utah Code Annotated 78-45-7 states:
"(l) Prospective support shall be equal to the
amount granted by the prior court order tmless
there has been a material change of circumstances on the part of the obliger or obligee.
(2) Where no prior court order exists, or a
material change in circumstances has occurred,
the court in determining the amount of prospective
support, shall consider all relevant factors

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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including but not limited to:
(a) the standard of living and the situation
of the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the
parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the need of the obligee;
(f) the age of the parties;
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for
the support of others."
Appellant cites this statute in his brief but neglects
to include subsection one which allows the court to give a
great deal of deference to the existing support order unless
there are changed circumstances.

The court had already

considered the issue of changed circumstances when it entered
the order of May 31, 1979, which reduced appellant's child
support obligation.

However, in the hearing held before Judge

Dee on August 22, 1979, the court again

heard testimony which

meets the requirements of U.C.A. 78-45-7 (1953 as amended).
The record reflects ample evidence of appellant's
ability to earn. He testified that he was a welder and boilermaker (T. 66 lines 6-9), a skilled tradesman, earning $12.00
per hour.

At the time of the hearing he had been unemployed

for three weeks, although he expected a call from his union
in the next weeks or days.

(T. 67 lire 30, T. 68, line 1).

He

further testified that he ordinarily worked "a good share" of
the year (T. 68 lines 2-5).

Appellant's testimony as to his

employment is strong evidence in support of the court's finding
that he is financially able to pay child support.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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While the record shows appellant to be a skilled
laborer, respondent works in a bar (T. 80) and has, at times,
had to resort to public assistance to maintain herself and
the boys. (T. 79).
The record is replete with evidence that all relevant
factors were considered by the court relating to the issue
of support even though the parties had already agreed to reduce the ongoing amount.

Since the court's ruling is supported by

ample evidence, there is no

show~ng

that the court abused its dis-

cretion in ordering support for John David, and the ruling
should not be overturned on appeal.
POINT II
JOHN DAVID AND JO~N JOSEPH ARE ENTITLED TO SUPPORT
FROM THEIR FATHER, AND THEIR MOTHER IS ENTITLED TO
REIMBURSEMENT OF SUPPORT FROM THE CHILDREN'S FATHER.
It is well settled law in Utah that a child has a right
to be supported by his or her father.

This right of support

cannot be waived by the child himself, Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 27 P.2d 434, 83 Utah 166 (1930), or
bartered away by the custodial parent.

Price v. Price 4 U.2d

153, 289 P.2d 1044 (1955), Riding v. Riding 8 U.2d 136, 320 P.2d
878 (1958), Gulley v. Gulley 470 P.2d 127 (1977), DeBry v. DeBry
27 U.2d 237, 496 P.2d 92 (1972), Baggs v. Anderson 528 P.2d 141
(1974).

So long as the parent and child are both living, the

right to support can only be extinguished by adoption (Riding,
supra) or by emancipation. Stanton v. Stanton 421US.7 (1975).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A party who provides support is entitled to reimbursement
for that support.

Baggs v. Anderson, supra, French v. Johnson

401 P.2d 315, 16 U.2d 360 (1965).

This is true whether the party

is the state, as in the case of Clark v. Department of Social Services, 554 P.2d 1320 (1976) or the stepparent

and parent as in

French v. Johnson.
The case of Wasescha v. Wasescha 548 P.2d 895 (Utah 1976)
is distinguishable from the instant case.

In Wasescha the mother

specifically testified that she was not requesting reimbursement
of money expended for support but that the money recovered would
be placed in a trust fund for the children's education.
case,

In this

though, the mother. is asking for reimbursement of money

she has expended for the boys' support.

She has a right to

contribution and reimbursement for the boys' support under the
divorce decree dated September 7, 1976, which gave her the right
to $500 per month as child support.
recognized

The court in Wasescha

that a parent had the right to be reimbursed even

though she did not have the right to collect past child support
payments to put into a fund for future use by the children.
is all the mother is asking for here -

That

reimburs'ement for past

money already expended and aid in future support of the child
who is still a minor.

That the mother needed help from the

father is evidenced by the fact that for a few months of the
time in question the mother had to resort to public assistance
to support the boys and herself (T. 79 lines 26-30, T.80 lines
1-3).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The children and their mother had a right under the
divorce decree to receive $250 per month per child as support
from appellant.
line 28).

He initially agreed to pay this amount (T.60

If the father felt this was an unreasonable amount

he could have gone to court at any time to request a modification of the child support provisions on grounds of changed
circumstances.

However, once the amounts became due, they

became unalterable and could not be modified.
561P.2d1077 (1977 Utah).

Larson v. Larson,

As to past due amounts, then, re-

spondent is entitled to full reimbursement.
The minor children of the parties will not receive
double support as a result of the trial court's ruling.

They

will only receive what is the right of any child, the support of
both its father and mother.

U.C.A. 78-45-3, U.C.A. 78-45-4.

POINT III
THE APPELLANT IS NOT RELIEVED OF HIS OBLIGATION
TO SUPPORT HIS SONS BECAUSE THEIR STEPFATHER
IS CONTRIBUTING TO THEIR SUPPORT.
The obligation of a

stepparent to support a

was established by legislation in Utah in 1979.

stepchild

Until U.C.A.

78-45-4.l and U.C.A. 78-45-4.2 were enacted there was no
statutory duty on the part of a
stepchild.

stepparent to support his

Appellant has not offered any evidence that Wyoming

law places any obligation on Mr. Bernard to support his stepchildren.

Utah law is not applicable in determining the obliga-

tion of Mr. Bernard to support his stepsons because the choice
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of law provisions of U.C.A. 77-31-7 (1953 as amended 1980) apply
to the duty of the obligor to support, not some third party
who has never been within the jurisdiction of Utah courts.
is doubtful that the

statut~

since much of his conduct as

It

would apply to Mr. Bernard anyway
a stepfather antedated the 1979

statute.
Even assuming that the Utah law does apply to Mr.
Bernard, it would not relieve appellant of the duty to support
his offspring.

The statutes relied upon by appellant are

part of a larger section of the code concerning the public
support of children, U.C.A. 78 sections 45, 45a, and 45b.
Repeatedly throughout the sections the legislature expresses
the intent that children should be supported by their natural
parents in an effort to alleviate the burden borne by the
general citizenry through welfare.

U.C.A. 78-45b-l.l.

It

seems faily clear that the intent of the legislature in
enacting U.C.A. 78-45-4.1 and U.C.A. 78-45-4.2 was to clear up
a loophole that existed in these statutes.

This loophole

allowed stepparents to shift the burden of supporting their
stepchildren off onto the state.
The statutes cited by the appellant do not have the
effect of shifting the duty of support to a stepparent.

They

simply denominate an additional person to whom the state can turn
to to enforce the child's right of support.

The statute does not

say that the stepparent is responsible for support to the
- 9 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

exclusion of the natural parent. In fact, the legislature
added U.C.A. 78-45-4.2 to insure that U.C.A. 78-45-4.1 not be
interpreted so as to reach that result.

It states:

"Nothing contained herein shall act to relieve
the natural or adoptive parent of the primary
obligation of support: Furthermore, a stepparent
has the same right to recover support for a stepchild from a natural or adoptive parent as any
other obligee." (Emphasis added).
Furthermore, the parents' obligation to support a child
exists until the child reaches majority or until the parents'
rights are ended by adoption.
P.2d 828 (1958).

Riding v. Riding, 8 U.2d 136, 320

A stepparent's obligation, on the other hand,

extends only until the relationship with the child's natural
or adoptive parent is terminated by divorce U.C.A. 78-45-4.1.
It is clear that appellant's reliance on U.C.A. 78-45-4.1
is misguided and that the enactment of this statute did not
relieve appellant of the primary obligation to support his sons.
POINT

IV

JOHN DAVID WAS NOT EMANCIPATED UNTIL HE REACHED
THE AGE OF 18 AND WAS, THEREFORE, ENTITLED TO
SUPPORT UNTIL HIS 18TH BIRTHDAY.
The appellant claims several factors that he says led
to a conclusion that John David was emancipated.

These factors

are that John David was not attending school, that he was
employed occasionally when able to find work, that he owned
three cars, and that he was engaged to be married.

On the

other hand, there are several factors which militate against a
- 10 -
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finding of emancipation.

During the entire period in question

he lived with either the respondent or the appellant (T.87 lines

21-24, T. 76 lines 4-28).

He received support from either his

mother or his stepfather during most of this time (T. 76 lines 4-28,

T. 86 lines 10-22, T. 91 lines 16-26,T.92 lines 1-11)

and was

only 17 years old at the time of the hearing. (T. 87 lines 10-11).
There was no formal or informal agreement to emancipate him;
further, he was not married or in the military. (T.91 lines 27-30).
There is no case law in Utah on what constitutes emancipation.

There is, however, a fair amount of case law in other

jurisdicticnsgiving standards for emancipation.
It seems fairly clear from the start that the child's
acts alone cannot constitute emancipation.

Utah Fuel Company,

supra, Neisen v. Neisen 38 Wis.2d 599, 157 NW.2d 660, 32 ALR 3d
1047 (1968).

The parent must emancipate the child through

actions that evidence an intent to emancipate the child, Tencza v.
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. 527 P.2d 97, 111 Ariz. 226 (1974).
The party wishing to prove emancipation has the burden of proof.
Holmes v. Raffo 374 P.2d 536, 60 Wash. 2d 421 (1962).
Among the elements to be considered in determining
whether a child is emancipated are:
(1) Whether the child lived with his parents or lived
alone, Tencza v. Aetna Casualty & Surety, supra.
(2) Whether the parent provided support for the child.
Tencza, supra; Fevig v. Fevig 559 P.2d 841 (N.M. 1977).
- 11 -
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(3) The age of the minor.

Fevig, supra.

(4) The intention and agreement of the parties Teneza,
supra.
(5) The ability of the minor to be self-supporting.
Fevig, supra.
(6) Whether the parent claiming emancipation has enough
control over the child to emancipate him. Bates v. Bates 310 NYS
2d 26 (1970).
(7) Whether the child is married or entering military

service. 58 ALR 2d 355, ALR 2d 1414, Sanders v. Levine 384 NYS 2d
636 (1976).
The authorities are virtually unanimous in declaring
that marriage will emancipate a minor.

Sanders v. Levine 384

NYS 2d 636 (1976), 58 ALR 2d 355 annotation.

There are strong

policy reasons for requiring a child who takes upon himself
the adult obligations of marriage and a family to give up the
protections of childhood.

However, these same policy considera-

tions do not exist where the child is only contemplating marriage.
Because of the minor's youth and inexperience, &0ciety encourages
a child to think very seriously about marriage before entering
into it.

We don't want to penalize teenagers who are contemplat-

ing marriage by taking away all parental obligations the minute
they announce an engagement.

Nor do we wish to permanently

deprive them of support thereafter even if they back out of
their marriage plans.

Therefore, this court should not find that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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an engagement to marry is enough to constitute emancipation.
The residence of a child is important in determining
whether a child has been emancipated because it goes to the
issue of parental support and control.

It is much more likely

that a child is emancipated if he is living away from home,
because his parents have less opportunity to control him or
provide him with sustenance.

The residence of a minor is also

important evidence of the intent of the parties, where there is
no formal agreement as to whether the child is emancipated.
John David has lived with one parent or the other
continuously. (T.87 lines 21-24).

Although this is not conclu-

sive evidence of lack of emancipation it weighs very heavily
against emancipation.

Because he was living with his mother

and/or father they had opportunity to control his actions or
behavior.

The fact that his mother supported him so readily

and let him live at home is also strong evidence that she lacked
the requisite intent to emancipate the child.

The fact that

he lived with his father is evidence that his father lacked
the intent to emancipate him, as well.
The· fact that his mother supported him is not only
evidence of lack of intent to emancipate but also evidence of
John David's own inability to support himself. (T. 77 lines 1-17).

If the parent did support the child it is a pretty good indicator
that the child was not really able to fend for himself.
The age of the minor is critical as well.

Not only

does John David's age, 17, give a clue as to his mental and
ph
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emotional maturity,it also indicates
- 13 -

a handicap in his ability to support himself.

Many job oppor-

tunities are not available to persons under the age of 18 or 21
(T.89 lines 23-27, T.94 lines 18-19, T.76 lines 21-24).

Even

more job opportunities are foreclosed by a lack of education and
experience.

Without the right to parental support he will have

a difficult time making up for his deficiencies in education or
training including the GED he intends to complete (T. 76 lines
26-30).
Even if a minor is emancipated from a parent's control
the parent may still be required to support him if he is in
need or the person who is supporting him requests reimbursement.
Fevig, supra, Neisen, supra.
on a parent who tries to
off onto another person

Most courts look with strorgdisfavor

~hift
o~

the burden of supporting his child

the public by claiming emancipation.

Public policy requires a strong showing of a child's ability to
fend for himself without aid before releasing his parents from
the obligation of support.

John David was clearly having problems

porting himself at such a young age and with so little education,
because he was out of work most of the time (T.96,97).
Courts in other jurisdictions have been very reluctant
to relieve a divorced father of child support payments because
he claims the child is emancipated. Neisen, supra; Bates, supra.
This is especially true where the father does not have custody of
the child.

The court in Bates even went so far as to say that a

non-custodial parent lacked the ability to emancipate the child on
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his own because the non-custodial parent had nothing to lose and
everything to gain from the emancipation.

The Bates court said

that the father did not have any control over his son to relinquish
and so he could not intend that his son be emancipated.
speaking, this makes good sense.

Practically

If parents could unilaterally

emancipate their children there would be millions of disgrunted
non-custodial parents around the country who would declare their
children emancipated and be free of the obligation to provide
child support.
The bottom line in the issue of emancipation is the
intent of parents to emancipate the child, and the burden of
proving that intent is on the person asserting emancipation.
Holmes v. Raffo, Tencza v, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., Fevig v.
Fevig.

The fact that John David lived at home, received support

from his family, was only 17, was single , and was unable to
provide for his own needs continuously suggest very strongly
that there was no emancipation.

The fact that John David's

father, the appellant, has so much to

gain by a finding of

emancipation is a suspicious circumstance indeed, and his contention of emancipation should be very carefully scrutinized.

The

fact that the trial court felt he did not meet his burden of proof
is very significant and this court should not overturn its decision
in light of the substantial evidence which supports its finding.

- 15 -
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POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT PRECLUDED BY RES JUDICATA
FROM CONSIDERING THE ISSUES OF ONGOING SUPPORT AND
ARREARAGES IN SUPPORT AT SEPARATE TIMES.
Before an issue or a cause of action can be precluded
by res judicata the following elements must exist.

There must

be a prior adjudication, which goes to a final judgment on the
issue in question.

The claims in both cases must be identical

and in some instances, the parties must be identical , as well.
The purpose of res judicata is to force parties to litigate all parts of their cause of action in the same suit.
cuts

This

down on the waste of the court's time and assures that the

matter is totally settled between the parties.

If the court

finds that an issue or cause of action has been litigated between
the parties previously, the parties are barred from raising
the issue or cause of action in a new suit.

East Mill Creek

Water Co. v. Salt Lake City 159 P.2d 863 (1945).
The final element, that of a prior suit, is missing
in this fact situation.

All of the actions taken and orders

made in this case have occurred in just one lawsuit brought
under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.

De-

fendant argues that because arrearages were not brought up
in the initial hearing the plaintiff is estopped to raise the
issue now.

However, a recent Utah Supreme Court decision has

held that even where there was more than one suit between the
parties, if an important issue which could have been litigated
was not actually litigated, the court may hear the issue and
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P.2d 1000 (1979).

In the instant case there was only one

suit and an important issue was not litigated.

As in the

Connnercial Security case there was no final judgment reached
between the parties on this critical issue and it would be
inequitable to deny the parties the right to litigate the issue.
In the case of Ray v. Consolidated Freightways 289 P.2d

196 (1955) the court allowed a suit between two tort-feasors for
damage to equipment even though in the original suit

against

both defendants, the court had found only one of the defendants
liable to the plaintiff.

The cross-claim between the two

defendants could have been brought in the original suit,
was not.

but

The court held that the new claim was not barred by

the doctrine of res judicata.

Quoting Justice Field in Cromwell

v. Sacramento County 94 US. 351 (1877) the court said.
Where there is a different claim or demand,
judgment in a prior action operates as an
estoppel only to those matters in issue,
or controversy upon the determination of
which the finding or verdict was rendered.
Inquiry must always be as to the point or
question actually litigated or determined
in the original action, not what might have
been thus litigated and determined. Only
upon such matters is the judgment conclusive in another action. 289 P.2d 196,199.
This is especially so in child support cases.

The

general custom in the community among attorneys is to discuss
current and ongoing support rights in one hearing and arrearages
in another hearing.

The main reason for this bifurcation is the

immediate need to provide for the child as those needs manifest

- 17 -
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themselves.

Another reason is the desire of the plaintiff's

counsel not to overburden the father at the outset with
arrearages and thus lose the cooperation of the father from
the start.
These are legitimate reasons for having two separate
hearings for the separate issues.

The Utah Supreme Court in

Harmon v. Harmon 491 P.2d 231 (1971) recognized that a divorce
is an equitable proceeding and as such, the courts had power
to issue

stays of execution on arrearages in child support

payments where it is necessary to allow the father to earn a
living or to gain his cooperation in the long run.

If the

courtshave the power to issue stays of executions in child
support cases, the court mµst surely have the power to divide
i

up

the proceedings so as

from the father.

The

~o

cour~

insure the greatest cooperation
said in Harmon:

In order to carry out the important responsibility of safeguarding the interests. and
welfare of children it has always been
deemed that courts have broad equitable
powers. To accept the plaintiff's contention that an adjudged arrearage is tantamont
to a judgment in law would, in the long run,
tend to impair rather than enhance the
abilities of both the plaintiff and the
court to accomplish the desired objective . . . .
For the foregoing reasons decrees and orders in
divorce proceedings are of a different and
higher character than judgments in suits as
law . . . . 491 P.2d 231, 232.
Another reason that arrearages were not discussed
in the first hearing was that the facts were not completely
capable of ascertainment at that time.

Therefore, the court
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delayed findings on the issue until it could be ascertained
where John David was living and how he was being supported.
Order of May 31, 1979.

This was to the defendant's benefit as

well as the plaintiff's, and the defendant should not be allowed
to complain about the division in hearings under these circumstances.
The

ord~r

of May 31, 1979, specifically states that it is temporary.

It also states that the County Attorney's Office in Green River,
Wyoming, was ordered to investigate the whereabouts of John David
because the court did not know where he was at that time.

The

amended stipulation of July 2, 1979, is even more emphatic
that there are additional facts which need to be ascertained. It
is true that these facts were necessary mainly for detennining
ongoing support of John David, but they are also relevant to
the issue of arrearages.

Thus, the orders given could not be

final because important issues were left to be determined.
In Kiepe v. Le Cheminant 22 U.2d 334, 453 P.2d 140 (1969)
the trial court entered a judgment after trial which stated that
"all disputes which now exist or shall arise (between the partners
in the business) are subject to the jurisdiction of the court."
One of the partners later sued and the other partner defended on
the grounds that the previous judgment was

~

judicata.

The

Supreme Court held that the judgment was conditional because it
looked forward to the ascertainment of further information and
further resolution of disputes between the parties.

Because the

judgment was conditional it could not be res judicata as to
further matters.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 19 -

The "judgment" in this case is even more conditional
than the judgment in Kiepe.

The judgment in this case unmis.-

takeably looks forward to the ascertainment of further information.

It definitely looks forward to the resolution of further

disputes because, by its own terms, it is only temporary.
Because the issue of arrearages was not and could not
be litigated at the time of the May, 1979, order, because the order
was only conditional, because all actions have taken place in one
lawsuit, and because policy considerations dictate a need for
special flexibility in the timing of arrearages and ongoing
support hearings,. this court should hold that the

trial court

was correct in dismissing appellant's res judicata defense.
CONCLUSION
Children have a right to be supported by their parents.
Parents cannot avoid that obligation simply because the child's
stepparent or the child himself is contributing toward the child's
support.

The primary duty of support lies with the parent, and

persons who step in and provide support are entitled to reimbursement.

U.C.A. 78-45-4.2, French v. Johnson, Baggs v. Anderson.

The child's right to support exists until he is adopted,
reaches majority, or is emancipated.
Stanton.

Riding v. Riding, Stanton v.

Whether a child is emancipated is an issue of fact,

but courts should be cautious as to find emancipation only where
the person claiming emancipation has proved the emancipation.
Holmes v. Raffo.

This is especially true where, as here, a father

is Sponsored
claiming
emancipation of a child whom he has a dutv to ~nnnni:t,
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but over whom he has no control or custody.
In all cases, but particularly so in divorce cases,
important issues which were not actually litigated should not be
precluded by res judicata.
Nine.

Connnercial Security Bank v. Corporation

This is especially true here, where the issue of arrearages

was dependent on information which was not available and could not
be ohtained at the time of the first hearing.

The order which

resulted from the first hearing was conditional on its face and
therefore, cannot act as res judicata in further proceedings Kiepe
v. Le Chemin ant .
Therefore, respondents pray that the judgment of the
trial court be affirmed and that the court rule that the appellant
is not relieved of his duty to support his sons.

Specifically, the

respondents pray that the court find that custodial parents and
stepparents have a right to reimbursement for monies expended in
the support of a non-custodial parent's child.

The court should

also find that a child is not emancipated simply because he holds
intermittent jobs or is engaged to be married.

Finally, the court

should hold that plaintiffs are not precluded from raising the
issue of arrearages because, for good cause, they failed to raise
the issue in a hearing to determine ongoing support.
Respectfully submitted,
TED CANNON
Salt Lake Cotmty Attorney

BY:.~
)JI t:~
SANDRA N. PEULER

c::

Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys
for Plaintiff-Respondent
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